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FLOODING THE MISSOURI VALLEY 
THE POLITICS OF DAM SITE SELECTION AND DESIGN 
ROBERT KELLEY SCHNEIDERS 
In December 1944 the United States Con-
gress passed a Rivers and Harbors Bill that 
authorized the construction of the Pick-Sloan 
plan for Missouri River development. From 
1946 to 1966, the United States Army Corps 
of Engineers, with the assistance of private 
contractors, implemented much of that plan 
in the Missouri River Valley. In that twenty-
year period, five of the world's largest earthen 
dams were built across the main-stem of the 
Missouri River in North and South Dakota. 
The size of these structures defies the imagi-
nation. Fort Randall Dam in southeast South 
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Dakota is 160 feet high and 10,700 feet long. 
The reservoir behind it stretches 140 miles 
north-northwest along the Missouri Valley. 
Oahe Dam, near Pierre, South Dakota, sur-
passes even Fort Randall Dam at 242 feet high 
and 9300 feet long.! Oahe's reservoir stretches 
250 miles upstream. The completion of Gar-
rison Dam in North Dakota, and Oahe, Big 
Bend, Fort Randall, and Gavin's Point dams 
in South Dakota resulted in the innundation 
of nearly 700 miles of the Missouri Valley from 
Yankton, South Dakota, to Williston, North 
Dakota.2 
The inundation of such a vast stretch of the 
Missouri River Valley caused tremendous 
changes in the lifestyles of the people who 
lived within or near the valley. Many Euro-
pean-American ranchers and farmers had to 
relocate their families and reestablish agricul-
tural enterprises in other areas. The residents 
of Niobrara, Nebraska, and Pollock, South Da-
kota, moved their homes and businesses after 
two Pick-Sloan dams flooded the towns. 
Indians in the Dakotas and Nebraska were 
affected by the inundation of their reserva-
tion lands-all of the Missouri Valley bottom-
lands located on the Crow Creek, Lower Brule, 
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Cheyenne River Sioux, Standing Rock, and 
Fort Berthold reservations. Indians on these 
reservations, and on the Yankton, Rosebud, 
and Santee reservations, lost a total of 353,313 
acres for reservoir water storage.3 In addition, 
the Indian towns of Fort Thompson (Crow 
Creek Reservation), Lower Brule (Lower Brule 
Reservation), Cheyenne River Agency (Chey-
enne River Sioux Reservation), and nine towns 
on the Fort Berthold Reservation were inun-
dated. Approximately 3538 Indians were 
forced to relocate from the valley lands to the 
uplands or to off-reservation towns.4 Another 
6900 Indians were affected in varying degrees 
of severity.s 
This article addresses a series of related 
questions. First, why did the Indians lose so 
much land and so many communities to the 
reservoirs of the Pick-Sloan Plan? Were the 
inundations of Indian land the inevitable re-
sult of a decision-making process that objec-
tively chose the best sites for dams and 
reservoirs on the Missouri River? Furthermore, 
why were Pick-Sloan's Missouri River dams 
and reservoirs designed and constructed at 
locations that were so disadvantageous to In-
dian interests? Why were the reservoir water 
storage levels behind each dam so high that 
large Indian populations had to relocate above 
the valley floor? In order to answer these ques-
tions, I begin with an examination of the ori-
gins of the Pick-Sloan Plan then detail the 
various factors that determined the location 
of Pick-Sloan's Missouri River dams. I con-
clude by arguing that the sites of the Pick-
Sloan Plan dams were chosen primarily for 
political reasons rather than because of geo-
logical or engineering considerations. 
ORIGINS OF THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN 
The Pick-Sloan Plan emerged out of the 
efforts of individuals and organizations 
throughout the Missouri River Basin who 
sought river development. The most impor-
tant of these was the Missouri River States 
Committee, formed in the early 1940s to pro-
mote a comprehensive development scheme 
for the Missouri River. Pick-Sloan was largely 
the creation of the Missouri River States Com-
mittee, which brought together numerous in-
terest groups that favored Missouri River 
development and enabled them to coordinate 
their efforts. The organization's power 
stemmed from its ability to lobby the public 
and Congress.6 
In the fifty years before 1940, small towns 
and counties throughout the Dakotas had pro-
moted small, localized river development 
schemes. For instance, business and political 
organizations in Mobridge, South Dakota, had 
sought a dam on the Missouri River to their 
west since the early 1920s. Mitchell, South 
Dakota, boosters had wanted a hydroelectric 
facility at the Big Bend of the Missouri since 
the 1910s. And members of the Lower Brule 
Tribe had lobbied the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs and the Department of Interior for the 
construction of a dam or power plant on reser-
vation land at Big Bend in the 1930s. All of 
these early promotional efforts came to naught, 
as no one river project garnered enough state-
wide political or financial support, and such 
federal officials as those in the Army Corps of 
Engineers who viewed dams as a threat to navi-
gation below Sioux City opposed Missouri 
River development in the Dakotas prior to 
the 1940s.7 
Beginning in the early forties, Missouri 
River development efforts expanded. Major 
cities and states within the Missouri River Ba-
sin began to organize to promote a program of 
interstate or federal development of the river. 
The states of the upper Missouri River Basin 
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(Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Wyoming) had endured a decade of drought 
and hardship in the 1930s and viewed im-
pounded Missouri River water as a resource 
for averting future economic downturns and 
agricultural disasters. These states hoped to 
solve their economic problems, stop out-mi-
gration, and prevent the hardships that the 
unpredictable weather patterns of the Great 
Plains had had on their economies.8 
Upper Missouri River Basin residents hoped 
to develop the Missouri River for irrigation, 
hydroelectric power, and navigation. Aware 
of the multiple economic problems in the Mis-
souri River Basin, Clifford Stone of Colorado, 
a lawyer and judge who had been instrumental 
in water resource development in his home 
state and who had organized an interstate co-
ordinating committee to develop the Colo-
rado River, advised the governors of the 
Missouri Basin to meet and coordinate their 
goals for river development.9 Stone believed 
that a unified basin lobbying group would be 
effective in securing project funds from the 
US Congress. lO 
In December 1941, one week after the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor and America's entry 
into World War II, representatives from the 
Bureau of Reclamation, Army Corps of Engi-
neers, business interests in the upper basin, and 
government representatives from the states of 
South Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming, Mon-
tana, and Nebraska met in Bismarck, North 
Dakota, to discuss and coordinate their plans for 
Missouri River development. This meeting re-
sulted in the formation of the Missouri River 
States Committee (MRSC). Over the next 
several years, this committee became influen-
tial in pushing for a comprehensive, basin-
wide program for the Missouri River.l1 
In July 1942 the MRSC held its first meet-
ing in Billings, Montana, and agreed to seek 
the participation of the other basin states in a 
permanent organization. By 21 May 1943 the 
MRSC had added Kansas, Missouri, and Iowa, 
for a total of eight members.12 This broader 
coalition of the Missouri River Basin's politi-
cal and economic interests, however, did not 
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FIG. 2. Merrill Q. Sharpe, c. 1942. Courtesy of 
Missouri River Division, US Army Corps of 
Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska. 
represent the Indians living on reservations 
adjacent to the Missouri Ri~er in Nebraska 
and the Dakotas. According to Robert Hipple, 
editor of the Pierre Capital Journal, a member 
of the MRSC's successor Missouri Basin Inter-
agency Committee, and a congressional lob-
byist for Missouri River development, the fully 
constituted MRSC did not have one Indian 
representative. As a matter of fact, the MRSC 
did not seek to include the Indians of the Mis-
souri Valley within the organization.B On the 
remote reservations of the upper Missouri 
River, the Indian population had little or no 
idea that plans and policies were being formu-
lated that would dramatically affect their lives. 
In 1943, the MRSC appointed South Da-
kota Governor Merrill Q. Sharpe (Fig. 2) as 
the committee's chairperson. Sharpe was a 
native of Kennebec, South Dakota, and had 
been involved in Missouri River development 
schemes since the early 1930s.14 Governor 
Sharpe would playa crucial role in the politi-
cal compromises that created the Pick-Sloan 
Plan. Under his direction the MRSC con-
ducted a massive public relations drive 
throughout the basin to garner public support 
for dams, channelization works, and levees 
along the Missouri River. Cities all along the 
valley, including Williston, Bismarck, Pierre, 
Chamberlain, Yankton, Sioux City, Omaha, 
and Kansas City, hosted public forums during 
1942, 1943, and 1944, but no forums were 
ever held in any of the Indian communities 
along the Missouri River.J5 
Why were the Indians of the Dakotas not 
represented on the MRSC and why were pro-
motional meetings only held in off-reserva-
tion towns and cities? First, the Indian 
population on the reservations could not af-
ford the hydroelectricity and irrigation water 
provided by any proposed project, so it did not 
make sense to the MRSC members to visit the 
reservations promoting products tribes could 
not buy. Second, the members of the MRSC 
conducted the meetings in the cities and towns 
that would provide the tax revenue for project 
construction. Since the reservation popula-
tion could not contribute to financing the 
project, they did not, from the committee's 
point of view, need to be convinced of the 
project's benefits. Finally, members of the 
MRSC, and off-reservation population in gen-
eral, believed Indian reservation lands were 
underutilized. They believed that reservation 
land was more beneficial to society at large 
and the Indians themselves if it was used for 
river control works than if it was left to the 
management decisions of the Indian popula-
tion and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 16 
At the MRSC-sponsored public forums, 
Army engineers and Bureau of Reclamation 
field agents explained how the river would 
actually be engineered to meet society's de-
mands. Business people and politicians ex-
plained the economic benefits of harnessing 
the water of the river. The public relations 
strategy was successful. There was no orga-
nized off-reservation opposition within the 
basin to controlling the Missouri River and 
using its waters to stabilize and promote the 
basin's economyY 
In the early forties opposition to a basin-
wide approach to controlling the Missouri 
River arose over the specifics of river develop-
ment, not development itself. In 1943 and 
1944, interest groups haggled over the types 
of dams and reservoirs to be built. Later in the 
decade, as several dams of the Pick-Sloan Plan 
neared completion, the debate centered on 
what organizations or governmental entities 
would administer the completed works. Dif-
ferent economic and political interests wanted 
different aspects of the river development plan 
stressed over others. 18 
Farmers, business people, and politicians 
from the upper basin (Montana, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, and Wyoming) represented by 
the National Reclamation Association, South 
Dakota Reclamation Association, Montana 
Stockgrowers Association and a number of 
chambers of commerce wanted dams that met 
their needs for irrigation and hydroelectric 
power. Lower basin residents from Kansas, Mis-
souri, Iowa, and Nebraska, led by the Kansas 
City Chamber of Commerce, Mississippi Val-
ley Association, and the National Rivers and 
Harbors Congress, wanted a plan that pro-
tected their cities from devastating floods, 
opened them to deep-draft barge traffic, and 
provided them with cheap power. The goals 
of the upper and lower basin did not coin-
cide. If the upper basin irrigationists received 
the water they wanted for their crops, com-
mercial interests in the lower basin believed 
they would have to abandon their navigation 
channel. Both upper basin and lower basin 
residents understood that water required to 
sustain a six-foot or possibly nine-foot naviga-
tion channel from Sioux City to St. Louis for 
eight months a year would lower the proposed 
upstream reservoirs and siphon off water re-
quired for irrigation. No one in the MRSC 
had an. immediate solution to this conflict of 
interest. 19 
Devastating floods in 1943 exacerbated the 
debate over river development. Three succes-
sive floods from April through June ravaged 
towns and farms throughout the valley.20 
Omaha, Nebraska, and the bottomlands east 
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of Kansas City, Missouri, sustained heavy dam-
age from the flood waters. The floods dis-
rupted rail and river traffic along the Missouri 
and Mississippi rivers during the wartime emer-
gency. High water also caused damage in lower 
Mississippi River states. The floods gave ur-
gency to the demands for Missouri River de-
velopment and prompted Congress, with the 
support of lower basin congressional represen-
tatives, to order the Army Corps of Engineers 
to submit a plan to prevent future flooding. 
The Corps responded with the Pick Plan, 
named for its author, Colonel Lewis Pick, the 
Army Corps of Engineers, Missouri River Di-
vision, Engineer Y 
Under the Pick Plan, the Corps proposed 
building dams at Garrison in North Dakota, 
and Oahe (Pierre), Fort Randall (Lake Andes), 
and Gavin's Point (Yankton) in South Da-
kota. 22 These four dams would fulfill lower 
basin demands for flood control and naviga-
tion and provide incidental irrigation and 
hydroelectric power benefits.23 The "Compre-
hensive Report on Missouri River Develop-
ment," an Army Corps of Engineers policy 
paper, stated that for the Pick dams, "Exclu-
sive power storage would not be provided but 
power would be generated with water released 
for navigation and sanitation purposes."24 The 
Corps made it clear that upper basin demands 
for irrigation water would be secondary to 
lower basin demands for navigation. 
The Pick Plan also called for the con-
struction of low, re-regulating dams below the 
big dams to eliminate destructive surges when 
the big dams released large amounts of water. 
Re-regulation prevented high water from erod-
ing river banks, disrupting downstream navi-
gation, and disturbing municipal water 
supplies. According to the Army Corps of 
Engineers "Comprehensive Report," these re-
regulating dams would "Be constructed a short 
distance downstream of each major dam, suf-
ficiently high to create poundage to permit 
releases from the lower dam at a uniform 
rate."25 Re-regulating dams were to be built 
below the Garrison, Oahe, and Fort Randall 
dams. The Army Corps of Engineers had not 
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chosen a definite site for a re-regulating dam 
below Garrison, but the re-regulating dam for 
Fort Randall would be at Gavin's Point, near 
Yankton, and for Oahe at the Big Bend of the 
Missouri. 
The Pick Plan split the Missouri River 
States Committee along regional lines. Prior 
to the plan's submission to Congress, the Army 
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Rec-
lamation had maintained a functional work-
ing relationship. The Pick Plan's public 
disclosure in February 1944 destroyed that 
alliance and pitted the Reclamation Bureau 
and its upper basin constituency against the 
Corps and its lower basin supporters. MRSC 
Chairperson Merrill Q. Sharpe favored the 
Pick Plan because it was the first compre-
hensive dam building program for the Mis-
souri River ever submitted to Congress. 26 
Although the plan favored navigation inter-
ests over irrigation, Sharpe considered it the 
best available and realized that South Dakota 
would benefit substantially from its imple-
mentation. 
Sharpe sought to gain the support of the 
upper basin states for the Pick Plan. During 
congressional hearings on 16-17 February 
1944, Sharpe urged cooperation between the 
various basin interests, presenting an insight-
ful analysis of the problems and potentials of 
river development. He noted that the con-
flict between the irrigation and navigation 
interests was predicated on a perceived short-
age of water and could be resolved through 
the construction of dams that could hold back 
enough water for both lower and upper basin 
needs. As he summed it up, "I think a com-
plete answer for many years to come is found 
in the single word 'storage'." Sharpe concluded 
by warning that if sufficient storage did not 
solve the conflict, then the entire develop-
ment plan would be threatened. 
It seems to me that such a result [increasing 
reservoir water storage capacity] should be 
reached rather than letting any conflict of 
interests bring the matter to an impasse 
which will deprive the Missouri Valley and 
the nation of the multiple benefits to la-
bor, agriculture, business, postwar adjust-
ment, and other national objectives which 
require that the project get started now ... 27 
Assurances of goodwill by the Army Corps 
of Engineers and Sharpe to build more storage 
into their Pick Plan were not enough to con-
vince the Bureau of Reclamation and upper 
basin irrigationists that their interests would 
be satisfied. In May 1944 the Bureau of Rec-
lamation responded with its own plan, which 
emphasized irrigation and hydroelectric 
power. This plan, known as the Sloan Plan 
after its author, William G. Sloan, a Bureau 
of Reclamation field agent stationed in Bill-
ings, Montana, called for the construction of 
dams on the main-stem of the Missouri River 
at Oahe (Pierre), Big Bend (30 miles north of 
Chamberlain), and Fort Randall (Lake Andes). 
The dams at Oahe and Fort Randall were to 
provide the necessary water storage to irrigate 
land in both North and South Dakota. The 
bulk of the land Sloan hoped to irrigate was 
located in eastern South Dakota in the James 
River Valley. The hydroelectricity produced 
by the three dams would pump stored water 
for irrigation while surplus electricity could 
be sold to recover the costs of the projects.28 
The submission of the Sloan Plan led Sharpe 
on a frantic effort to mend the split between 
the upper and lower basin states and between 
the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army 
Corps of Engineers in order to save a com-
prehensive, basin-wide development plan fi-
nanced by the federal government. On 
5 August 1944 Sharpe called the MRSC to 
Omaha, Nebraska, where upper and lower ba-
sin interests recognized the folly of attempt-
ing to develop the Missouri River without 
each other's cooperation. If the two factions 
went their own separate ways, the develop-
ment plan would be jeop~rdized by the result-
ant political and legal infighting. Congress 
would not authorize the construction of two 
programs in direct conflict with one another, 
so the upper basin states and the Bureau of 
Reclamation joined with the lower basin states 
and the Army Corps of Engineers to create a 
revised river development plan that met the 
needs of all interested groupS.29 
At the Omaha meeting the MRSC passed a 
resolution that satisfied the demands of upper 
basin interests and made the Pick-Sloan com-
promise possible. Point five of the resolution 
stated, 
That authorization of the Bureau of Recla-
mation plan now before Congress ... is 
necessary to a comprehensive development 
of the Missouri River .... We ask the Presi-
dent and the Congress of the United States 
to authorize and direct the United States 
Army Engineers and the United States Bu-
reau of Reclamation to bring before Con-
gress a coordinated plan ... 30 
The MRSC then distributed this resolution 
throughout the executive and legislative 
branches of the federal government. The suc-
cess of the compromise was contingent upon 
the site selection and design of multiple-pur-
pose dams. The dams proposed by the Bureau 
of Reclamation in the Sloan Plan and by the 
Army Corps of Engineers in the Pick Plan were 
designed almost exclusively for their particu-
lar constituencies. If the compromise were to 
work and the off-reservation interest groups 
of the entire basin were to avoid legal hag-
gling over the river's water, the plans of the 
Army Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Rec-
lamation had to be altered, new dam sites cho-
sen, each previously proposed dam redesigned, 
and reservoir water storage capacities in-
creased. Only these alterations would insure 
continued congressional support for the de-
velopment of the Missouri. All parties in-
volved realized that disunity among the basin 
states would threaten congressional appropria-
tions for the projects.3l 
LOCATING THE DAMS 
A number of hurdles had to be overcome 
for the multiple-purpose dam concept to be 
successful in the Missouri Valley. First, proper 
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sites had to be chosen for the construction of 
the dams. Second, the dams and reservoirs 
had to be designed in minute detail to insure 
that basin interests received the promised ben-
efits. And third, the weather had to cooperate 
by producing enough rainfall to fill the reser-
voirs. The first two hurdles could be overcome 
with the proper application of science and 
technology, but no one controlled the weather, 
and this worried everyone. If the rains did not 
fall and drain into the Missouri Valley to be 
stored behind the dams, the political compro-
mise that had created the Pick-Sloan Plan 
would crumble. 
Site selection was dependent upon geology, 
cost-effectiveness, demographics, and politi-
cal considerations. The geological character 
of the Missouri Valley limited the area of pos-
sible sites to the upper basin. From Fort Peck 
Dam in Montana to Yankton, South Dakota, 
the Missouri Valley is only one to five miles 
wide, but below Yankton, the valley widens 
dramatically, becoming an alluvial flood plain 
five to seventeen miles across, through which 
the river meanders great distances. Dams in 
the lower valley would be exorbitantly expen-
sive because they required great amounts of 
earth fill, and they would be unsafe because 
subsurface mineral deposits are less stable over 
long stretches. Thus, the dam engineers fo-
cused their attention on the Missouri in North 
and South Dakota where the valley is narrow 
and relatively stable subsurface minerals ex-
ist.32 
The Missouri Valley in South Dakota is 
underlain with deposits of Pierre shale and 
Niobrara chalk. Engineers deemed both of 
these subsurface minerals suitable for the 
placement of large earth-fill dams, but the 
depth of these minerals affected the cost of 
the dams. Since the dams had to be attached 
to the chalk or shale, digging down to deeper 
deposits would be more costly.33 Another geo-
logical consideration was the relation of the 
sites to tributaries of the Missouri River. The 
dams needed to capture all, or most, of the 
water entering the valley, because if a major 
tributary's water were not captured its flood 
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FIG. 3 . Portions of the original Indian community of Lower Brule. Courtesy of the Missouri River Division, 
US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska. 
waters could wreak havoc on downstream ur-
ban centers and agricultural lands and possi-
bly disrupt navigation.34 
Non-geological factors also affected the 
cost-effectiveness of the dam sites. Engineers 
had to consider the proximity of sites to avail-
able transportation facilities, since large pieces 
of machinery and equipment would have to 
be brought in by railroad and highway. For a 
site distant from a railhead or highway, the 
cost of constructing a road would have to be 
added to the cost of the dam itself.35 
The dams also had to be close to towns, 
housing, hospitals, and recreational facilities, 
as construction personnel needed food, cloth-
ing, shelter, medical care, and some place to 
spend their spare time. The Corps could not 
afford to construct these facilities at the site, 
so dams near cities or towns were preferable.36 
Engineers also considered the difficulty and 
cost of acquiring the lands needed for dam 
sites and reservoirs as well as the cost of relo-
cating valley residents. Purchasing prime ag-
riculturalland, or expensive urban real estate, 
would have increased the overall cost of a 
dam's constructionj therefore, "underutilized" 
or cheap, "low quality" Indian land was pref-
erable.37 Furthermore, moving a large off-res-
ervation urban population-and railroad 
bridges, sewer facilities, buildings, and other 
property-would cost far more than moving 
residents of Indian reservations whose worldly 
possessions and homes had less market value. 
Since power was to be one of the products of 
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FIG. 4. The relocated Indian community of Lower Brule, January 1964. The abandoned town can be seen in 
the background. Courtesy of the Missouri River Division, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska. 
the dam, transmission lines carrying the hy-
droelectric power from the site to the avail-
able market needed to be as short as possible. 
The biggest influence on site selection for 
the dams of Pick-Sloan, however, was the re-
lation of the dams to off-reservation urban 
centers in the Dakotas. Each dam and reser-
voir had to spare the large urban centers while 
providing the reservoir storage capacity to 
meet the water demands of basin interest 
groups. The importance of the population 
centers to the site selection process was ex-
plicitly stated in the 1944-45 "Comprehen-
sive Report on Missouri River Development": 
In determining the location of the multiple-
purpose reservoirs, consideration must be 
given to the existence of cities which might 
be wholly or partially inundated by these 
reservoirs, and the railroads and highways 
crossing the river in the reservoir areas. 
Larger cities in this category are Chamber-
lain, Pierre, and Mobridge in South Da-
kota, and Bismarck and Williston in North 
Dakota. Accordingly, the sites described 
in this report have been selected at such 
distances downstream from these cities that 
sufficient storage [in the reservoirs] will be 
provided without undue flooding of expen-
sive real estate .... Thus the height to 
which Fort Randall Dam can be built is 
limited by Chamberlain and the railroad 
and highway crossings in that vicinity, 
while the proximity of the city of Pierre, 
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FIG. 5. Fort Randall Dam, c. 1950. In this photo, the embankment of the dam rises above the valley floor. After 
massive Euclid dump trucks deposited earth on the surface of the embankment, bulldozers and rollers compacted the 
material. The Corps of Engineers and the Missouri River States Committee limited the height of Fort Randall Dam 
to prevent excessive water damage to the town of Chamberlain, but these organizations did not reduce the dam's 
height to spare the Indian community of Fort Thompson, approximately 30 miles north, northwest of Chamberlain. 
Courtesy of the Missouri River Division, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska. 
S. Dakota, to the upper reaches of the Fort 
Randall Reservoir precludes any further 
consideration for dams below Pierre. 
The report continued, 
One of the reasons for selecting the Garri-
son site was that it is above Bismarck .... 
The storage limit for Garrison reservoir was 
dictated by damages imposed at and in the 
vicinity of Williston, near the Montana 
border.38 
By October 1944 the Corps, the Bureau of 
Reclamation, and the MRSC had come to an 
agreement on the selection of dam sites on 
the Missouri River. There were to be five 
dams on the main-stem of the river. Four 
dams, Oahe, Big Bend, Fort Randall, and 
Gavin's Point, were to be built in South Da-
kota. The fifth, Garrison, was to be located in 
North Dakota. Engineers and politicians chose 
these dam sites because of their cost-effec-
tiveness and topographical attributes. Most 
importantly, the five dams of the Pick-Sloan 
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FIG. 6. Fort Randall Dam and Lake Francis Case. c. 1965. The Corps of Engineers began storing water behind 
Fort Randall Dam in November 1952. Within a few months. Fort Randall Reservoir stretched twenty-five miles 
upstream. By the fall of 1954. the reservoir (later named in honor of South Dakota Senator Francis Case) 
approached its maximum level. inundating vast tracks of valley bottomland on the Crow Creek and Lower Brule 
Indian reservations. Courtesy of the Missouri River Division. US Army Corps of Engineers. Omaha. Nebraska. 
Plan would minimize damage to off-reserva-
tion urban centers in the Dakotas while still 
providing the reservoir storage capacity to sat-
isfy off-reservation demands for flood control, 
navigation, hydroelectricity, and irrigation. 
SACRIFICING INDIAN LANDS 
Indian lands and towns located along the 
Missouri River in the Dakotas and Nebraska 
did not receive the same degree of consider-
ation in the site selection and design of Pick-
Sloan's dams that off-reservation cities re-
ceived. The Corps, the Bureau of Reclama-
tion, and the MRSC were unwilling to change 
the sites of Pick-Sloan's dams or alter their 
reservoir storage capacities to spare Indian 
valley lands or towns. The reason was simple-
any reduction in reservoir storage capacity to 
take into consideration Indian interests would 
mean a reduction in the cost-to-benefit ratio 
of the project. An unfavorable cost-to-ben-
efit ratio increased the likelihood that Con-
gress would not fund the project. Moreover, if 
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Indian interests in preserving their lands from 
inundation, or in developing the Missouri 
River for their own needs and wants, had been 
considered by the MRSC, Corps, and Bureau 
of Reclamation, off-reservation interests would 
have received fewer benefits from the dam 
projects and this in turn would have threat-
ened the implementation of the Pick-Sloan 
Plan. A reduction in benefits to off-reserva-
tion interests might have led to the withdrawal 
of congressional support for the plan. 
Excluded from the planning process, the 
Indians of North and South Dakota discov-
ered that much of their land had been sacri-
ficed to the Pick-Sloan dams in order to make 
the plan a reality. Without the reservoir water 
storage provided by the Indian reservation bot-
tomlands, the Pick-Sloan compromise would 
not have been possible. Maximizing reservoir 
water storage capacity was the key to the com-
promise and only Indian lands could provide 
the water storage space. None of the planners 
recognized that the bottom lands were of irre-
placeable economic value to the Indians, who 
could hunt and grow traditional crops on lands 
that were "useless" only from the point of view 
of technologically dependent commercial ag-
riculture. Without the Indian bottomlands, 
dams and reservoirs on the main-stem of the 
Missouri would not have been as cost effec-
tive for non-reservation populations, which 
in turn would have threatened their sources of 
congressional funding. Engineering consider-
ations were a factor in the site selection and 
design of Pick-Sloan dams, but political con-
siderations, especially a concern for maintain-
ing the Pick-Sloan compromise and sparing 
off-reservation urban centers, were the pri-
mary reasons the dams and reservoirs were 
designed to be so high and built at locations so 
disadvantageous to Indian interests. 
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